Skewness of the wage distribution in a firm and the substitutability of labor inputs

wages;game theory;organizational structure;managerial science

A note on the t-value and t-related solution concepts

Game Theory

Axiomatizations of the conjunctive permission value for games with permission structures

Game Theory;econometrics

Ranking the nodes in directed and weighted directed graphs

Graphs;Econometrics

A social power index for hierarchically structured populations of economic agents

Econometrics;econometrics

On Hierarchies and Communication

Many economic organizations have some relational structure, meaning that economic agents do not only differ with respect to certain individual characteristics such as wealth and preferences, but also belong to some relational structure in which they usually take different positions. Two examples of such structures are communication networks and hierarchies. In the literature the distinction between these two types of relational structures is not always clear. In models of restricted cooperation this distinction should be defined by properties of the set of feasible coalitions. We characterize the feasible sets in communication networks and compare them with feasible sets arising from hierarchies